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Abstract
Birth rates differ strongly across European states, despite the deep economic har-
monisation process related to European integration. This study uses large scale ad-
ministrative data from France and Germany to analyse and directly compare fertility
patterns in two major European economies over a period of 15 years. Strong evidence
is found that opportunity costs play a role in fertility decisions, and for a positive
income effect for females with high earnings. Females in Germany adapt their fertility
behaviour more strongly in response to economic incentives than their counterparts
in France. This is explained by pronounced differences in the national approaches to
childcare support.
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1 Introduction
All countries of the European Union exhibited fertility rates below replacement level in
2017 (World Bank 2019a). This fact demonstrates the difficulty for family policies in in-
dustrialised countries to achieve their main objectives: increase birth rates and conciliate
childbirth and labour market participation. In order to set the right incentives, it is of
eminent importance for policy makers to understand fertility behaviour and its relation
to labour market decisions in the context of country-specific settings. In this study, we
present a comparative micro-level analysis of fertility in two major European countries,
namely France and Germany for the years 1994 to 2007. These countries are characterised
by substantial differences in fertility (Figure 1), female labour force participation (Figure 2)
and institutional settings. During the relevant period, France has a quite stable birth rate,
among the highest in the European Union, while Germany is characterised by a low and
declining birth rate. Until the mid 2000’s, French family policies have mainly targeted the
compatibility of full-time work with having children by providing various types of childcare
services. At the same time, Germany has stuck to the male breadwinner model, granting
financial compensation to mothers rearing children at home. The empirical literature eval-
uating the effectiveness of family policies on a macro level provides evidence that family
policies investing in a better work-family conciliation are more effective at raising fertility
rates than those providing financial assistance to parents (Hantrais, 2004; McDonald, 2006;
Gauthier, 2007).
Figure 1: Average birth rates.
Source: World Bank 2019b.
Figure 2: Average weekly hours worked
per dependently employed woman × fe-
male labour force participation rate.
Source: OECD 2019a and OECD 2019b.
Most of the existing empirical literature on fertility behaviour either focuses on country
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comparisons with aggregate data (e.g. Ahn and Mira, 2002; Adsera, 2004; Billari and
Kohler, 2004) or uses individual-level data from only one country (e.g. Heckman and Walker,
1990; Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1994; Wang and Famoye, 1997, Francesconi, 2002;
Adda et al., 2017). Cross-country analyses with individual-level data are limited and rely
on rather small survey data sets (e.g. Lauer and Weber, 2003; Del Boca and Sauer, 2009).
Interestingly, the empirical results obtained from macro and micro data seem contradictory.
Micro-level studies find empirical evidence of a negative effect of female wages and labour
market attachment on fertility due to high opportunity costs (Heckman and Walker, 1990;
Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1994; Caudill and Mixon, 1995; Wang and Famoye, 1997;
Francesconi, 2002; Baudin et al., 2015; Adda et al., 2017). Macro studies focusing on cross-
country differences find a positive relationship: countries with high female labour force
participation rates tend to exhibit higher levels of fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000;
Ahn and Mira, 2002; Billari and Kohler, 2004; Adsera, 2004, all for the time period between
the 1970s and 1990s). The empirical findings regarding the relationship between employment
and fertility are therefore ambiguous, and depend on whether evidence comes from a given
country, or from comparing two countries. Our objective is to study this paradox by using
data with both individual and country-level dimensions.
This paper presents a pioneering cross-country analysis of fertility behaviour of French
and German women based on large scale linked administrative panel data for the two coun-
tries. In particular, we use the French DADS-EDP and German BASiD datasets. As
these data sources result from national operational processes, we made substantial efforts
in creating comparable data sets for the two countries. Besides presenting a number of
new comparative stylised facts, we estimate econometric panel count models for fertility
behaviour at the individual level. These models exploit the individual employment histories
and allow for forms of endogeneity that arise from omitted variables and simultaneity in
decision making. To our knowledge, previous analyses of fertility have mainly not been
based on panel analysis. Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1994), Silva and Covas (2000) and
Melkersson and Rooth (2000), all using count data models, consider only the number of
children at the end of the reproductive cycle instead of the number of children evolving over
time. Wang and Famoye (1997) only pick one wave of data and Caudill and Mixon (1995)
simply neglect the panel structure. Del Boca (2002) estimates a binary panel model of fer-
tility in Italy. We are only aware of one related cross-sectional study for the two countries:
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Lauer and Weber (2003) use household survey data but focus on labour force participation
after childbirth. By doing a pooled cross-sectional analysis they do not exploit the panel
structure of their data to address endogeneities.
We obtain a number of interesting findings. We confirm the hypotheses derived from
an economic model and previous empirical evidence concerning cross-country and within-
country relationships between female opportunity costs and fertility. Regarding both timing
of births and total fertility, we find that responses to opportunity costs are more pronounced
in Germany than in France. For both countries, we find a positive effect of female wages on
the number of children for women with the highest wages. Since the only source of household
income considered in this paper is female wage, we use income and wage interchangeably.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 compares the contextual settings of
France and Germany. Section 3 states the main economic hypotheses to be analysed, while
Section 4 presents the data sets and some stylised facts. The econometric model is presented
in Section 5 and the main estimation results are given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Family Policies in France and Germany
Systematic differences in fertility behaviour between French and German women are likely
due to different historical and cultural backgrounds, social conventions and resulting family
policies. Here we focus on the period 1994 to 2007. While there was still a strong historical
attachment to the male breadwinner model in Germany, the French state provided support
and incentives for young mothers to return to the labour market quickly. Besides the goal
of reconciling work and family life, the French system promoted families of three or more
children. In contrast, Germany did not encourage young mothers to return to work nor
favoured large families but supported child-rearing at home with cash benefits. In the
following, we briefly compare the different national childcare arrangements, child-rearing
benefits and aggregated transfers during the aforementioned period.
A - Childcare The French transition from the male breadwinner model to the dual
model began in the 1970s, following a sharp rise in women entering the work force. In Ger-
many, a slow abandonment of the male breadwinner model only started in the 1990s with
a policy-induced expansion of childcare places for children between three and six years old.
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However, measures to support French working parents were expanded at the same time,
resulting in a persistent gap in childcare provision between both countries (Fagnani, 2010).
For instance, the French government began to subsidise registered private childminders in
the 1990s. Unlike in France, the German approach to childcare was characterised by a
shortage of childcare places for children below the age of six, a late entry into daycare and
an incompatibility between the regular working hours of parents and the opening hours of
day care institutions. For more details on these policies see Brewster and Rindfuss (2000),
Plantenga et al. (2005), Lewis et al. (2008), Fagnani and Math (2010) and Salles et al.
(2010). Plantenga et al. (2005) suggest that the childcare coverage rate for children under
three was only 8% in Germany in contrast to 43% in France in 2004. For children aged three
to six, the difference was lower thanks to the above-mentioned transformation process: 89%
in Germany compared to full coverage in France. Due to this low supply of childcare places
in conjunction with traditional gender roles, it was more difficult for mothers in Germany
to return to paid work. OECD data confirm these patterns: while both countries spent
similar percentages of GDP on family cash benefits between 1994 and 2007, government
expenditure on family services was approximately twice as high in France as in Germany
(OECD 2019c). In addition, expenditure on childcare and education was between 1.8 and
3.6 times higher in France than in Germany.
Salles et al. (2010) explain these fundamental differences by a historical long-term trend.
The German standards are claimed to have been formed in response to the National So-
cialism and the Communism, by focusing on the families and giving public institutions a
minor role. In contrast, essential features of the French family policy were formed during the
late 19th century as an attempt to limit the power of the church by intervening in citizen’s
private lives.
By the end of the observation period, Germany started a reform process which was ac-
companied by an increase in fertility. In particular, Germany began to promote female
employment and to invest in public childcare (Fagnani and Math, 2010). Bauernschuster
et al. (2016) have shown that the expansion of public child care in Germany caused an
increase in fertility rates.
B - Child-rearing benefit Another important difference between the two countries was
in paid parental leave arrangements, as summarised in Table A.1 in the Appendix. These
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benefits were meant to partially compensate earnings losses due to child-rearing. In both
countries, child-rearing benefits were lump-sum amounts and having an additional child
during the benefit reception period renewed the eligibility duration. Here, the French aim to
encourage large families was particularly visible: the French Allocation parentale d’e´ducation
(APE) was initially provided to parents of at least three children, extended to parents of
two children in 1994 and was replaced by the Comple´ment de libre choix d’activite´ (CLCA)
in 2004. The CLCA was also accessible for parents of one child, but only for a short time
period. Piketty (2005) estimates that up to 30% of the French increase in births between
1994 and 2001 was due to the extension of the APE to mothers of two children. The German
Erziehungsgeld (1986-2007) was provided from the first child on and did not vary with the
number of children. The Erziehungsgeld did not impose any conditions in regard to past
labour performance. Conversely, a French parent needed to have worked for at least two
years preceding birth, creating some form of labour market attachment. In addition to
the APE, French parents received a means-tested basic allowance until the child was three
years old. This benefit was independent of the employment decision. The German child-
rearing benefit encouraged part-time work: exercising a part-time job did not reduce the
Erziehungsgeld whereas the amount of APE was halved when working part-time.
Traditions in work-family conciliation and the availability of childcare seem to play an
important role: Plantenga et al. (2005) show that the take-up rate of the child-rearing
benefit was 85% in Germany. In France, less than half of the entitled French households
received the child-rearing benefit. French recipients were mainly young, unemployed or
low paid women (Morel, 2007; Algava et al., 2005; Piketty, 2005). In short, in France the
APE plus the basic allowance encouraged mainly low-paid or unemployed women to become
pregnant, favoured large families but did not affect much female labour force participation.
In Germany, the Erziehungsgeld in combination with a shortage of childcare places did
not encourage mothers to oppose tradition and carry out full-time work, but to raise their
children at home, which has been linked to lower fertility levels (Brewster and Rindfuss,
2000; Ahn and Mira, 2002; Billari and Kohler, 2004; Adsera, 2004).
C - Aggregate incentives set by tax breaks and social benefits In order to com-
prehensively compare financial and institutional settings, additional policy measures need
to be taken into account. In Germany, until the child turned 27, parents received either a
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child cash benefit (Kindergeld) or a child tax allowance (Kinderfreibetrag), depending on
what was more beneficial for the parents. Both measures became slightly more generous
as the number of children increased. In France, until the child turned 20, parents received
both a child benefit (Allocations familiales) and an income tax reduction realised by raising
the quotient by which the taxable income was divided before taxation took place (Quotient
familial). For the first and second child, the divisor by which the taxable income was divided
increased from 2 to 2.5 for a couple, for the third and every subsequent child by one (with
a maximum ceiling). The French child benefit also increased with the number of children
but started only from the second child onward. In addition, there was an income-tested
supplement (Comple´ment familial) for the third and every subsequent child. Baclet et al.
(2005) combine the incentives set by the income tax, the child cash benefits and the child
tax reductions to a so-called effective tax rate. For both countries they find that the ef-
fective tax rate decreases with the number of children. The evolution of the effective tax
rate with income differs between both countries: for households earnings below a certain
threshold, the effective tax rate is lower in Germany than in France. For pre-tax incomes
greater than 36.000 - 45.000 Euros (depending on the marital status and the number of
children), however, the German effective tax rate is above the French effective tax rate.
For a more complete picture, social assistance and housing benefits also need to be taken
into account. The resulting aggregate transfers in France are U-shaped in family income:
on the one hand, low-income families gain relative to median earners due to the means test
for the basic allowance of the early childhood benefit. On the other hand, high-income
families benefit from the quotient familial (Bechtel et al., 2005). Adema and The´venon
(2008) expand the French study to other OECD countries. They find that transfers in
Germany are almost constant in household income and increase modestly for high incomes.
3 Economic Mechanisms and Hypotheses
This section briefly summarises the economic mechanisms behind the female decision prob-
lem of the optimal number of children and and their testable implications. The optimal
number of children results from a timewise separable economic model of utility maximisa-
tion, which is presented in the supplementary material S.I. While the optimal number of
children is assumed to be the solution to the same mathematical problem in both countries,
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the parameters are permitted to differ between countries to capture the cultural and institu-
tional differences between France and Germany. We derive two main economic hypotheses
focusing on these cross-country differences that are subsequently tested with data.
1 - Opportunity costs: numerous and flexible childcare arrangements in France reduce
the opportunity costs of having a child in terms of foregone wages, career impediment and
skill depreciation. In contrast, a weaker family-work conciliation in Germany increases the
opportunity cost of children. This leads us to the hypothesis that within both countries the
optimal number of children decreases with (full-time) employment, education and wage, and
that these partial relationships are more pronounced in Germany than in France. Putting
this in the context of the macro literature on labour supply and fertility, we claim that the
country with higher female labour force participation rates (France) exhibits higher fertility
rates than the country with lower female labour force participation rates (Germany) because
of lower opportunity costs due to a better conciliation of family and professional life.
2 - Effective tax reduction: as pointed out in Section 2, for both countries the effective
tax rate decreases with the number of children. At high levels of income, this tax reduction
is larger in France than in Germany. In addition to average tax reduction, the French
promotion of large families also increases the marginal effective tax reduction per each
additional child. Integrating these features into our economic model implies two hypotheses:
firstly, we expect a relative increase in fertility at high levels of income in both countries.
Together with the negative opportunity costs of having children this translates into a U-
shaped pattern in the effect of wages on fertility. Secondly, we conjecture that the positive
effect for high wages is more pronounced in France than in Germany. For high-earning
French women, the negative opportunity costs might even be outweighed by the reduction
in the effective tax rate.
The next section describes the data used to test our hypotheses and provides some first
descriptive results.
4 Data and Stylised Facts
We construct comparable samples from two administrative data sources for the two coun-
tries. This is a non-trivial exercise given that these data sources differ substantially in shape
and content as they are collected through different processes. In this section we provide a
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brief overview of how this comparability is achieved and present first stylised facts. More
details on the data preparation and descriptive statistics are given in Appendix A.II.
The German Biographical Data of Selected Social Security Agencies in Germany (BASiD)
links administrative individual-level data from the Federal Employment Agency and the In-
stitute for Employment Research to data from the German Pension Insurance.1 The pension
insurance covers 96% of the German population, from which a 1% random sample is made
available via the BASiD. The dataset encompasses individuals up to the age of 67 who held
an insurance account at the end of 2007, provided that they had at least one entry and that
they were still alive. Periods of employment, training measures, registered unemployment
and certain types of inactivity are reported with exact dates. Furthermore, the database
provides information on average daily salary, occupation, type of employment (full-time
versus part-time), characteristics of the employing firm and demographic information such
as gender, age, educational achievements and dates of birth for any children.
The French panel De´claration Annuelle des Donne´es Sociales - Echantillon De´mographique
Permanent, 2010 (DADS-EDP 2010) contains socio-demographic information of individuals
observed in the EDP combined with administrative employment data from the DADS since
1976. Drawing its information from civil registers and the census, the EDP contains details
on education, marriage and fertility. Only persons born from the 1st to the 4th of October
of each year are followed. Since 2004 the dataset is enriched by individuals born from the
1st to the 4th of April and July. The information in the DADS stems from mandatory decla-
rations completed by all businesses with dependently employed staff. It comprises data on
start and end dates of employment, wages, hours worked, types of contract and occupation.
Self-employed, civil servants and individuals that have never been employed do not appear
in this data. Since 2004, persons living in French overseas territories have been included,
whereas before 2004 only continental France was considered.
The French dataset is more selective than the German dataset in terms of individuals in-
cluded and periods recorded: the DADS-EDP exclusively encompasses persons with at least
one record of non-self-employed work, whereas the BASiD also covers individuals that have
never been dependently employed but were observed by the Federal Employment Agency
or the Pension Insurance for a different reason, for example due to voluntarily insured self-
employment or the eligibility for minimum income support. Selection into these datasets
1Detailed information on the dataset can be found in Hochfellner et al. (2011).
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is therefore not entirely random and might hereby induce biases for our country-specific 
estimates. Individual employment histories are less complete in the French data than in the 
German data because the former exclusively contain periods of dependent employment. This 
restriction affects the set of explanatory variables included in the comparative two-country 
analysis as the current and past labour market states likely affect fertility behaviour. Un-
fortunately, no information on marital status and hence on a potential partner is recorded 
in the BASiD. The French dataset contains the date of marriage but without current up-
dates on marital status nor information on the spouse. Information on personal preferences, 
religion or social conventions is not provided in any of the data sources. We will exploit the 
longitudinal dimension of the data to address the omission of important variables. The pre-
cision of our analysis benefits from the large cross-sectional and longitudinal data dimensions 
that are not available with survey data. Furthermore, errors due to misstatements in the 
birth and employment variables are unlikely since they are key variables of administrative 
records.
We construct comparable annual panel datasets for the period 1994 to 2007 for the 
two countries. The panels are based on employment records of women aged between 18 
to 45 in the respective years. For a detailed description of the data preparation and the 
harmonisation of the data sets see Appendix A.II. In both samples, a woman is observed for 
at least one and at most 14 years. The German panel contains 173,843 females, the French 
panel 102,574. When we construct aggregate birth rates from the BASiD and the DADS-
EDP, they are somewhat lower than the birth rates reported by the national statistical 
institutes, even when not restricting the dataset. This could be caused by the selectivity 
of the datasets or by unregistered births, which probably occurred after the last observed 
record. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables and the estimation samples are 
given in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
The remainder of this section provides a descriptive analysis of fertility in the two coun-
tries. Table 1 presents the average completed fertility rates by age cohort, education and 
country. No numbers are reported for the youngest birth cohort (born between 1979 and 
1989) since the maximum age they can reach in the data is 28 years. The table confirms that 
birth rates are higher in France for all cohorts and educational groups. A French woman 
aged 45 has on average at least 0.5 children more than a German woman of the same age, 
which is sizeable. Females in the third birth cohort are aged between 29 and 38 in 2007.
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Even though not all of the females belonging to this cohort have reached the end of their
reproductive life at the end of the observation period, most have. French women of this
cohort have on average twice as many children as their German equivalents. This number
is in line with our hypothesis about different economic incentives in Germany and France.
Table 1: Average number of children per cohort and education
Cohorts Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
I II III No VT VT TE No VT VT TE No VT VT TE
G 1.47 1.19 .67 1.59 1.46 1.26 1.24 1.23 .91 .75 .71 .37
F 1.97 1.82 1.27 2.19 1.96 1.77 1.91 1.85 1.70 1.43 1.30 1.18
∆ .50 .63 .60 .60 .50 .51 .67 .62 .79 .68 .59 .81
Notes: Completed fertility at age 45 or last observed age if not available. Cohort I: born 1949-58,
Cohort II: born 1959-68, Cohort III: born 1969-78. VT=Vocational Training, TE=Tertiary Education,
G=Germany, F=France, ∆=Difference between France and Germany.
Table 2 digs a bit deeper into the formation of the completed average birth rates. It
suggests that the lower average in Germany is driven by both a higher share of childless
women and a lower share of women with two or more children. For the two birth cohorts
with completed fertility, the share of childless women in Germany is around twice as high
as in France. The German pattern sizeably changes over cohorts: the share of German
women remaining childless more than doubles between the first and the third cohort, while
the share of German mothers of two children more than halves. Sobotka and Beaujouan
(2014) refute the potential explanation that a fading two-child norm has caused this drop.
They find a stable ideal family size of more than two children for (West) Germany for the
entire period from 1979 to 2011. Our results, however, suggest that actual figures deviated
increasingly from desired outcomes. In France, the share of childless women also doubled
over cohorts but the share of women having two children remained nearly constant. In
France, the decrease in the share of women having three or more children is remarkable: for
the first birth cohort the share was around 30%, for the third only 11%.
It is also apparent from the two tables, that the average number of children varies
strongly with the mother’s level of education. In particular, females with a higher level of
education tend to have fewer children. This is considered in more detail in the following
two paragraphs.
11
Table 2: Share of women by number of children, by cohort or education in %
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III No VT VT TE
G F G F G F G F G F G F
0 24.7 13.5 35.4 16.7 56.9 30.3 42.4 16.8 40.1 20.0 60.9 27.0
1 24.3 20.7 25.2 19.9 24.4 26.2 26.2 22.1 25.8 22.8 16.1 22.5
2 36.1 36.6 28.3 39.0 14.5 32.3 19.5 37.3 25.5 35.8 18.4 35.2
3 11.3 19.8 8.4 17.6 3.4 9.2 8.2 16.7 6.7 15.4 4.0 12.1
4+ 3.7 9.4 2.7 6.8 0.8 2.1 2.9 7.2 1.9 6.1 0.7 3.2
Notes: Completed fertility at age 45 or last observed age if not available. Cohort I: born 1949-58,
Cohort II: born 1959-68, Cohort III: born 1969-78. VT=Vocational Training, TE=Tertiary Education,
G=Germany, F=France.
B - Number of Children by Education Table 1 suggests that for any educational
group, women in France have, on average, more children than women in Germany. The
between country difference in the average number of children (∆) is U-shaped in the level
of formal education: the difference is most pronounced for high and low-educated females,
and is smaller for those with vocational training. The U-shaped pattern may be caused
by high opportunity costs for German university graduates or by the likewise U-shaped
design of the French aggregated monetary benefits distributed to parents, see Section 2.
For each educational group, the share of childless women in Germany is more than twice
as high as the share of childless women in France (Table 2). In line with patterns found
by Baudin et al. (2015) for the US, the distribution of childlessness by educational degree
is J-shaped in Germany. In France, childlessness is constantly increasing with educational
degree. These findings also point into the direction of particularly pronounced opportunity
costs for females in Germany with a tertiary education degree and females in France with
the medium educational level.
In France, the propensity to have two children is extremely pronounced for all educational
groups. For low, middle and highly educated women, the share of mothers of two children
is more than 1.5 times the share of mothers of a single child. In Germany, highly educated
mothers seem to respond most to the two-child norm, and low educated mothers least.
C - Number of Children by Age Figure 3 focuses on age at first birth depending on
education. To measure the share of females in the presence of censoring, we use the Kaplan-
Meier estimator. This simple non-parametric estimate of a fraction takes into account that
not all females reach the age of 45 years. In the German case, the age distribution becomes
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Figure 3: Age at first birth per educational level
Notes: Share of mothers by age and educational level at first birth. Kaplan-Meier Product Limit estimator.
less bell-shaped with higher educational attainment. In contrast, the distribution exhibits
a bell-shape for any level of education in France. The cross-country differences for women
with tertiary education are striking: below 25 years and above 33 years, the percentages of
women having their first child are slightly higher in Germany than in France. For the ages
in between, the share is much higher in France than in Germany. Apparently, females in
Germany that hold a university degree tend to either shift forward or postpone their first
birth. This could be in order to not interfere with their initial years in the labour market.
French women seem to combine career and childbearing as the distribution is narrowly
centred around the peak at age 28, shortly after labour market entry. In Germany, these
curves also become flatter with birth cohorts (Figure 4). In contrast to older cohorts, the
age distribution for German women of the third cohort exhibits a relatively flat maximum
between the age of 25 and 32. This may partly but not entirely be due to the fact that
the share of women who have studied increased by five percentage points from the first
to the third cohort. This flattening of the age distribution indicates that German women
born later face difficulties to combine work and family. In contrast, the shape of the French
distribution does not change much over cohorts. Only the peak shifts from 23 years for the
first to 28 years for the third birth cohort. Overall, being older when having the first child
seems to have become more beneficial or more common in both countries.
Figure 4: Age at first birth per cohort
Notes: Share of mothers by age and birth cohort at first birth. Kaplan-Meier Product Limit estimator.
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D - Labour Market State and Tenure We complete the descriptive analysis by con-
sidering the relationship between fertility, the current labour market state and the length
of current employment duration. Table 3 shows the share of females giving birth to a child
while being non-employed. For the first child, the share is similar in both countries: 47%
of all German females and 45% of all French females who give birth to a first child do so
while being non-employed. In France, the percentage increases modestly for the second and
the third child. In contrast, the increase for the second and the third child is much more
pronounced in Germany.
Table 3: Births during non-employment
1st child 2nd child 3rd child
Germany 47 65 74
France 45 48 58
Notes: Share of women having their first, second or third child
while being non-employed in %.
The comparatively low share of births during non-employment for the second and third
child in France may indicate that well-functioning childcare arrangements allow French
women to refrain from fully withdrawing their labour when having a child, and from squeez-
ing multiple births into the same period of inactivity. This supports the findings by Ro-
drigues and Vergnat (2018). In contrast, mothers in Germany seem more likely to withdraw
from the labour market after childbirth and to have several children during the same career
break. These results are in line with Arntz et al. (2017).
Figure 5: Tenure at birth
Notes: Share of women delivering a child by tenure.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of females giving birth to a child as a function of employ-
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ment duration at the same establishment (tenure). Since in both countries paid maternity
leave starts six weeks before birth, we focus on tenure prior to maternity leave and thus
show tenure two months before birth. In both countries, the propensity initially increases
until up to ten months and thereafter begins to decrease. The peak at about twelve months
prior to birth is higher in France than in Germany and the subsequent decrease is steeper
in France than in Germany. This does not reflect the incentives set by the eligibility criteria
for the child-rearing benefit in France, which require at least 24 months of employment with
the same employer prior to birth. At tenure levels of more than three years, the share of
women giving birth for the first time is higher in Germany than in France. This is likely due
to the finding that German women tend to have children later, after their full integration
into the labour market.
We find descriptive evidence for fertility patterns to differ sizeably across the two coun-
tries. The remainder of the paper focuses on isolating partial relationships between relevant
factors and fertility while holding the other factors constant.
5 Econometric Approach
We use count data regression models to estimate the partial relationship between various ob-
servable factors and the number of children born. In particular, we apply different Poisson
panel regression models. This section only states the main model equations and defini-
tions. A more detailed presentation is given in Appendix A.III. There we also discuss the
adequateness of different model restrictions in relation to our application to fertility data.
Let yit denote the number of children for female i = 1, ..., N and period t = 1, ..., Ti.
yit can only take on non-negative integer values m = 0, 1, 2.... The non-negative expected
number of children conditional on individual characteristics xit (1×K) and an unobserved
time-invariant individual effect ai ≥ 0 is
E[yit|xit, ai] = ai λit = ai exp(xitβ), (1)
where β is a (K × 1) vector of unknown parameters. It is common for count models to
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assume a Poisson distribution
yit|xit, ai ∼ P(ai λit), (2)
despite the restriction that the Poisson distribution is fully characterised by its first moment.
An important advantage of Poisson (panel) estimators is that they are consistent as long
as the conditional mean is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984). This holds even
with misspecified higher moments, although at the expense of efficiency. Models with other
count distributions may therefore be more efficiently estimated but have the disadvantage
of being more complex and time intensive. Given the size of our data set we give a lower
priority to efficiency.
In the above model, the marginal effect (ME) of the j’th (continuous) component of xit,
xitj, on the expected number of children is
MEj =
∂E[yit|xit, ai]
∂xitj
. (3)
In a model without interaction terms we have
MEj = ai exp(xitβ)βj = βj E[yit|xit, ai] (4)
which depends on xit and ai. Computing the marginal effect is not possible without knowing
ai. However, βj gives the proportionate increase in E[yit|xit, ai] when xitj changes by one unit
and can therefore be interpreted as semi-elasticity. The correlated random effects (CRE)
model assumes the conditional expectation of ai to be linear in xit. In contrast to the random
effects (RE) model, however, it does not assume independence. An appealing advantage of
the CRE model is that it computes coefficients for the time constant variables and permits
computation of (average) marginal effects, since E[ai|xit] is known. Estimation can be done
by maximum likelihood (ML). Serial correlation between observations for the same female
requires further corrections. We therefore report cluster-robust standard errors, which are
implemented using block bootstrap, where clustering is done at the individual level. For
comparison we also estimate a linear fixed effects model which is much simpler but does not
restrict the count variable to be nonnegative and integer valued.
We estimate pooled, RE, CRE and fixed effects (FE) variants of the Poisson model that
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differ in the restrictions required for consistency, in particular for the relationship between
ai and the xit. A comprehensive technical treatment of these models is given in Appendix
A.III along with a detailed discussion of how these models are affected in absence of strict
exogeneity of regressors. We argue that the FE and CRE models are more adequate in
the context of our application because they permit for correlation between observables and
unobservables. In what follows, we mainly refer to the results for the CRE model, because
it is only possible to compute the average ME for the CRE model. Most of the obtained
patterns appear robust across models. We evaluate the average ME for unit changes in
one of the variables by computing sample averages of differences in estimated conditional
expectations, while holding all other variables constant at their observed values.
6 Empirical Results
For both countries, a Wald-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that unobserved correlated
individual characteristics do not play a role at a significance level lower than 0.001. Hence,
we report and interpret the results for the Poisson CRE model for the two countries. The
full set of results for the Poisson and linear regressions is given in the Appendix (Table A.3
and A.4). As outlined in Section 5 we focus our interpretation on the average ME; reported
in Figure 6 along with their 95% block bootstrap confidence intervals.
When we compare the results for the two countries, we make several interesting obser-
vations. Within each country, higher opportunity costs generally harm fertility outcomes.
Impacts of current employment, wages and education are similar in direction for both coun-
tries, though more sizeable in Germany as predicted by our economic model. Using the
population average counterfactual fertility we show that the relatively lower German birth
rates are indeed due to opportunity costs related to observed, employment related charac-
teristics and not due to unobservables. While the results regarding opportunity costs are in
accordance with main findings of empirical micro and macro studies (Heckman and Walker,
1990; Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1994; Wang and Famoye, 1997; Brewster and Rind-
fuss, 2000; Francesconi, 2002; Ahn and Mira, 2002; Billari and Kohler, 2004; Adsera, 2004;
Baudin et al., 2015; Adda et al., 2017), we detect a positive income effect for high female
wages in both countries, which is in contrast to findings of previous studies. We provide
evidence for fertility decisions not being static as the timing of births depends on tenure,
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Figure 6: Average Marginal Effects of the Poisson CRE Model
Notes: The dependent variable is number of children. The graph is based on Tables A.3 and A.4 in the
Appendix. For better visibility, marginal effects of age are divided by 10. Confidence intervals are based
on 100 bootstrap replications (this value was chosen due to very long computing times). VT=Vocational
Training, TE=Tertiary Education, PT=Part-time, FT=Full-time.
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age and state of employment in both countries. Trends in fertility behaviour are similar in
both countries as the effects of cohort and year suggest. For both countries, the youngest
cohorts have dramatically fewer children than earlier cohorts. Even though we control for
age among other factors and hold them constant, the estimate for the youngest cohort could
be affected because the youngest cohort is still young at the end of the observed period. For
this reason it was not considered in the descriptive analysis.
In what follows, we focus on variables related to opportunity costs and income effect
(Paragraph A), variables related to the timing of births (Paragraph B), and compare average
birth rates with average counterfactual birth rates for both countries (Paragraph C ).
A - Opportunity Costs and Income Effect For both countries, higher educational
attainment is associated with a lower number of children. These partial relationships are
significant and large in magnitude. For categorical variables, such as education and wage,
it is of interest to consider both the estimated partial effect in relation to the reference level
and the difference in estimated effects between levels. We observe differences in the pattern
over educational levels between France and Germany: having a vocational training reduces
the number of children by 0.08 children in France, while having a university degree further
decreases the number of children by 0.11 children. The estimated partial effect is smaller
in size for German trained professionals (-0.05), but the additional decrease for university
graduates is much stronger (-0.23). With more than 0.25 children compared to the reference
level, having a tertiary education diploma sizeably affects fertility in Germany. This finding
is in line with most other studies (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1994; Wang and Famoye,
1997; Jones and Tertilt, 2008; Baudin et al., 2015). However, for young US-American
women, Hazan and Zoabi (2015) report higher fertility rates for highly educated women
than for medium educated women. In addition to the level effect of education on the number
of children, the interaction terms of age with education suggest that a higher educational
level of the mother is associated with a stronger postponement of birth in both countries
(see Table A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix). While in Germany the postponement is more
pronounced the higher the educational level, in France females with completed vocational
training do not postpone birth more strongly than females with no formal educational
degree. Using similar categories of education, Lauer and Weber (2003) find no significant
effect of education on the overall birth decision in Germany, except for postponement of
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birth. Although related, their results are not directly comparable because they consider a
binary fertility decision.
We also provide evidence that higher wages are associated with a decrease in the number
of children. Although this is found to be present in both countries, the effect is much
stronger in magnitude for Germany than for France. This indicates that higher opportunity
costs induced by a weaker work-family compatibility indeed play a role. Theses findings
contrast those of Lauer and Weber (2003), who do not find evidence that wages are related
to the birth decision. The effect of wages varies with the wage level, in particular, there is
evidence for a positive income effect for high female wages. In Germany, the average ME
for the top one percentile (around 10,000 observations) are significantly higher than those
in the lower wage bracket. In France, this pattern already starts at the top five percentile.
For French females in the top one percentile (around 6,000 observations), the wage effect
is not even significantly negative. This positive relation at high wage brackets is robust
to different specifications of the econometric model and to the inclusion of further control
variables and is of high interest as it differs from most previous studies (e.g. Winkelmann and
Zimmermann,1994; Wang and Famoye,1997; Jones and Tertilt, 2008). We see two possible
explanations for the pattern for high wages: firstly, the wage pattern matches the pattern
of the financial incentives set by aggregate tax reductions (see Section 2). These incentives
also justify why the positive effect at high wages is stronger in France than in Germany.
A second explanation can be linked to the findings by Hazan an Zoabi (2015) for the US.
They claim that the use of childminders leads to changes in relative costs of childcare. The
substitution of the childminders’ time for parental time leads to a higher fertility for highly
educated females. Since we do not observe potential partners, this substitution might also
take place with respect to the spouse. It is interesting to note that in France and Germany
the proposed substitution of someone else’s time for own time takes place only with regard
to wages and not with regard to education. Opportunity costs of having children consist
of foregone wages, skill depreciation, career impediment, and lost utility intrinsic to paid
work. If we assume that the effect of education is likely to capture skill depreciation and
career impediment and that the estimated parameter of income captures opportunity costs
in terms of foregone wages, our results suggest that the positive income effect at high wage
levels can outbalance opportunity costs caused by foregone wages but cannot cancel out
costs incurred by career damages and skill depreciation.
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Regarding the employment status, opportunity costs of having children also weigh more
heavily for females in Germany than in France. The significant negative effect of full-time
employment is estimated to be more than twice as large for Germany (-0.05) as for France (-
0.02). Our results suggest that working part-time increases the propensity of having children
both compared to not being employed and to being full-time employed in both countries.
Part-time employment seems to act as a typical instrument enabling women to combine
family and work.
The significant positive German coefficient of being a primary or nursery school teacher
suggests that the sorting of women who plan to have a (large) family into professions with
a high amenity value regarding children indeed takes place. This confirms results found by
Adda et al. (2017) for Germany. Interestingly, the same coefficient is negative for France,
probably because the conciliation between children and work is better for many professions.
To sum up, opportunity costs reduce the number of children in both countries, with the
extent being much larger in Germany than in France. A positive income effect is detected
for high female wages, which in turn is more pronounced in France than in Germany.
B - Timing of births The descriptive findings presented in Section 4 suggest that the
timing of births is related to age, tenure at the current firm, the past (in addition to the
current) employment and the career stage. This is supported by our estimates of partial
relationships. In particular, our results suggest for the two countries that the longer the
tenure, the greater the marginal effect on fertility. While the effect is virtually zero for a
period up to one year, it becomes increasingly sizeable for longer tenure. This pattern is
more pronounced for France, presumably because it is more common for mothers in France
to return to the same employer after childbirth than for mothers in Germany (Rodrigues
and Vergnat, 2018 for France; Arntz et al., 2017 for Germany). Eligibility for French child-
rearing benefit requires two years of tenure before birth. While the average ME of two to
three years tenure is larger than the ME for one to two years, it is smaller than the ME
for three or more years of tenure. Thus, in line with the descriptive evidence and probably
related to the low take-up rates, we do not find indication of substantial strategic adaptation
of the timing of births to ensure benefit eligibility.
Following Francesconi (2002), an increase in female wage serves as proxy for career
advancement and is thus associated with additional opportunity costs. In both countries,
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experiencing a wage increase significantly reduces the number of children. The estimated
ME is rather small in size though, in particular in Germany.
Having been non-employed during the past year significantly and importantly increases
fertility in Germany (+0.14). It seems that the positive effect of reduced opportunity costs
outweighs the negative effect of enhanced economic insecurity. The German data allows us
to disentangle the effect of past unemployment from the effect of past inactivity. Table S.1 in
the supplementary material S.II presents estimation results when variables indicating other
labour market states are included. Interestingly, even past unemployment has a significantly
positive effect on fertility. However, the positive effect of past inactivity is much larger in
size: past inactivity increases the absolute number of children by 0.5 children. This finding
supports the results by Arntz et al. (2017) who find a high propensity for German women to
have a second child during the job protection period of the first child. The French coefficient
of non-employment on fertility is negative and significantly different from zero. Mothers
in France appear to behave differently. However, the composition of the effect of non-
employment cannot be assessed in France due to data restrictions. In France, opportunity
costs of having children might be small to the point that a reduction in opportunity costs
due to non-employment cannot compensate the negative effect of economic insecurity. The
negative effect might also be related to the finding by Rodrigues and Vergnat (2018) that
the proportion of mothers having a second child during the parental leave period of the first
child is small.
In summary, females in both countries postpone birth to later ages and refrain from
having children shortly after a wage promotion. The effects of tenure and past employment
differ between both countries, likely due to differences in labour market participation around
childbirth.
The supplementary material (S.II) contains additional results. The country-specific re-
gressions with enlarged regressor set suggest that the patterns of Figure 6 are mainly robust,
which indicates that the omission of certain variables is not harmful. In addition to the
country-specific regressions, robustness checks have been conducted using different cut-off
dates when constructing the yearly panel. No relevant differences have been detected.
C - Average Birth Rates and Counterfactual Analysis The existing literature using
micro and macro data is somewhat contradictory regarding the relationship between female
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labour force attachment and wages on the one side and fertility on the other side. While
studies based on micro data find evidence for a negative relationship (e.g. Heckman and
Walker, 1990; Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1994; Wang and Famoye, 1997; Francesconi,
2002; Jones and Tertilt, 2008; Baudin et al., 2015; Adda et al., 2017), macro data based
results suggest the opposite (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Ahn and Mira, 2002; Billari
and Kohler, 2004; Adsera, 2004). We use the available data and regression results to
compare population average fertility with counterfactual fertility. This is, we consider the
hypothetical scenario that the population of females in one country behaved according to
the parameters of the other country. The resulting numbers are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Average number of children
Sample average Average predicted∗ Average counterfactual∗∗
G 0.65 0.76 1.05
F 1.04 1.13 0.28
∗ Sample average of fitted values from the CRE Poisson model (Table A.3 and A.4, column 6).
∗∗ Sample average of fitted values using the coefficients of the individual-specific effect from the CRE
Poisson model from the own country and the coefficients on observables from the CRE Poisson model
from the other country.
The average number of children is higher in France (1.04) than in Germany (0.65). The
CRE Poisson model predicts slightly higher means for the two countries but it is not far
off. The counterfactual average number of children for females in Germany if they had the
coefficients from France is 1.05, while the same number is 0.28 for females in France if they
had the coefficients from Germany. Our little exercise shows that the observed economic and
demographic factors of our model are adequate to approximate average fertility and that the
country differences in average fertility can be well explained by diverging responses to the
observed factors. Conversely, country differences in unobserved factors, such as culture or
norms, or different composition of observables across countries, are not the drivers behind
the staggering gap in aggregate fertility between the two countries.
7 Conclusions
During the 1990’s and 2000’s a substantial decrease in birth rates was observed in Germany,
while birth rates in France remained stable at a roughly 50% higher level. In this paper,
we argue that the relatively low rate in Germany is mainly due to the fact that German
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women adapt their birth decisions much more to economic incentives than their French
counterparts. The degree of adjustment to economic aspects depends on the opportunity
costs of children caused by lost earnings opportunities and career damages. The effect of
opportunity costs on the number of children is about twice as high in Germany as in France.
We motivate this result by better childcare arrangements in France which facilitate the
combination of motherhood and career. Interestingly, and in contrast to previous findings,
we detect a positive income effect at high levels of earnings. In France, this pattern is
more pronounced and corresponds to a large extent to the financial incentives set by the
overall family policy mix. We provide evidence that adjustments take place not only with
respect to the number of children, but also with respect to the timing of births. Especially
in Germany, highly educated women have a strong tendency to postpone births to a later
age when career advancements are supposed to have already taken place. Besides with age,
the timing of births is aligned with the employment status. In addition to finding stronger
negative effects of opportunity costs in Germany, we confirm by constructing counterfactuals
that lower birth rates in Germany are due to different observable parameters of the female
fertility decision.
We reason that differences in opportunity costs and unobserved individual preferences
in relation to fertility arise from national policies, institutions and societal approaches. Our
results suggest that the former drive the differences in fertility behaviour between both
countries and within each country. Therefore, our results reconcile the ostensible contra-
diction between the positive relationship of fertility and female labour force participation
across countries and the negative relationship within a country.
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A.I Tables
Table A.1: Summary of child-rearing benefits in France and Germany
APE - France Erziehungsgeld - Germany
1985 - 2004 1986 - 2007
Min. number
of children re-
quired for eligi-
bility
1985 - 1994: three
1994 - 2004: two
since 2004 (CLCA): one
One
Benefit duration 3 years (CLCA with only one
child: 6 months)
8 months gradually increased to
22 months
Past employ-
ment condition
for parents with three or more
children: 2 of the 10 years preced-
ing birth; for parents with only
two children: 2 of the 5 years
None
Income condi-
tion
None From month 7: Annual net family
income <29.400DM + 4.200DM
for each addit. child.
Since 2001: During first six
months 30.000e. From month
7: benefit reduction if income
>16.500e. Each time + 3.140e
for each addit. child1
Partial employ-
ment
Yes, but benefit reduction Up to 15h/week without benefit
reduction (since 1989: 19h/week,
since 2001: 30h/week)
Amount (1994) 450e/month 300e/month
Take-up rate2 <50% 85%
Source: If not stated otherwise, Fagnani, 1994. 1 Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und
Jugend, 2004. 2 Plantenga et al., 2005.
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Table A.2: Description of the independent variables
Factor Time Description S hare in %
variant Germany France
Age Yes 18-22 years 17.8 16.1
23-27 years 21.1 19.7
28-32 years 21.2 20.3
33-37 years 18.3 19.7
38-45 years 21.7 24.3
Education No No VT 20.2 13.4
VT 45.9 55.2
TE 32.9 31.4
Employment Yes Not employed 42.4 53.5
Part-time 18.0 15.9
Full-time 37.9 30.6
Past employment Yes Not employed 50.4 64.2
Gross Wage Yes <25% 56.8 64.1
<50% 14.4 11.4
<75% 14.4 12.0
<90% 8.6 7.5
<95% 2.9 2.5
<99% 2.3 2.0
>=99% 0.6 0.5
Change in wage relative Yes negative 21.2 18.3
to past year positive 45.9 30.4
>median 32.9 51.3
Tenure at firm Yes <6 months 10.2 12.1
6-11 months 7.9 4.0
12-23 months 12.8 10.6
24-36 months 9.5 8.4
>36 months 59.5 65.0
Child-friendly profession Yes Yes 2.2 2.2
Twins Yes Yes 0.7 0.6
Multiples Yes Yes 0.0 0.5
Birth cohort No 1949-58 8.3 9.1
1959-68 32.4 36.9
1969-78 44.2 39.5
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Factor Time Description S hare in %
variant Germany France
1979-89 15.1 14.5
Year Yes 1994-1996 19.9 20.0
1997-1999 21.2 21.7
2000-2002 22.1 22.6
2003-2005 22.3 22.1
2006-2007 14.5 13.6
Variables only observed for France
Iˆle-de-France Yes Yes 21.1
Married Yes Yes 31.8
Born overseas No Yes 2.0
Variables only observed for Germany
Former GDR No Yes 13.6
Federal state Yes No info. 24.4
SH & MV 3.1
LS & B 6.3
NRW 16.7
Hesse 6.6
RP & S 4.4
BW 11.4
Bavaria 12.5
B & H 5.1
S & B 5.7
T & SA 3.9
Foreigner1 No Yes 34.7
Unempl. last year Yes Yes 16.1
Inactive last year Yes Yes 14.2
Unobs. last year Yes Yes 23.7
Notes: 1Based on nationality. Reference categories of the following regressions are underscored.
SH & MV = Schleswig-Holstein & Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, LS & B = Lower Saxony &
Bremen, NRW = North Rhine-Westphalia, RP & S = Rhineland-Palatinate & Saarland, BW =
Baden-Wuerttemberg, B & H = Berlin & Hamburg, S & B = Saxony & Brandenburg, T & SA =
Thuringia & Saxony-Anhalt.
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Table A.3: Baseline Results Germany
Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Age
23-27 0.23*** 0.08*** 1.26*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 0.94*** 0.34***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
28-32 0.56*** 0.23*** 1.78*** 1.23*** 1.34*** 1.25*** 0.66***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
33-37 0.83*** 0.30*** 2.08*** 1.30*** 1.43*** 1.31*** 0.80***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
38-45 1.03*** 0.27*** 2.26*** 1.23*** 1.39*** 1.24*** 0.78***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Education
VT -0.01*** -0.69*** -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
TE -0.11*** -2.76*** -2.48*** -2.34*** -0.28***
(0.00) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01)
Education × Age
VT × 23-27 0.00 -0.01*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TE × 23-27 -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.86*** 0.86***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
VT × 28-32 0.00 0.00 0.66*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
TE × 28-32 -0.18*** -0.16*** 1.98*** 1.53*** 1.66*** 1.66***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
VT × 33-37 0.03* 0.03*** 0.71*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.55***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
TE × 33-37 -0.14*** -0.09*** 2.47*** 1.83*** 1.99*** 1.99***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
VT × 38-45 0.01 0.02** 0.71*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.55***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
TE × 38-45 -0.07*** -0.05*** 2.67*** 1.88*** 2.08*** 2.07***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Employment
Part-time 0.26*** 0.01*** 0.39*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 ) (0.00) (0.00)
Full-time 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Employment
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Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Not empl. 0.28*** 0.02*** 0.42*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage
25-49% -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50-74% -0.19*** -0.10*** -0.27*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75-89% -0.30*** -0.16*** -0.44*** -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.15***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90-94% -0.39*** -0.19*** -0.58*** -0.20** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.17***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
95-98% -0.49*** -0.20*** -0.85*** -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.20***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
99-100% -0.54*** -0.22*** -1.15*** -0.05** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Wage Increase
>0 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
>median -0.11*** 0.05*** -0.13*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in months
6-11 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
12-23 0.12*** 0.02*** 0.19*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
24-35 0.11*** 0.01*** 0.20*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
≥36 0.09*** -0.00*** 0.19*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupational Choice
Teacher 0.08*** -0.01** 0.15*** 0.00 0.01* 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort
1959-68 -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.44*** -0.21*** -0.16***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1969-78 -0.37*** -0.34*** -1.19*** 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
1979-89 -0.41*** -1.25*** -2.52*** -0.59*** -0.37***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
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Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Year
1997 - 1999 -0.03*** 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2000 - 2002 -0.05*** 0.15*** -0.12*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2003 - 2005 -0.09*** 0.20*** -0.17*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2006 - 2007 -0.14*** 0.25*** -0.22*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Averages of time-varying covariates
Agei 0.64***
(0.01)
Wagei -0.16***
(0.01)
Empli 0.15***
(0.01)
∆Wagei -0.75***
(0.02)
Tenurei 0.13***
(0.01)
PastEmpli 1.24***
(0.02)
1/A 3.08(∗∗∗) 2.90(∗∗∗)
(0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.29*** 0.37*** -2.19*** -0.96*** -3.39***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Observations 1,863,267 1,863,267 1,863,267 889,645 1,863,267 1,863,267
RSS in 1,000 1,195 123
LL in 1,000 -1,673 -768 -1170 -1,167
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors based on 100 bootstrap replications (this
value was chosen due to very long computing times). Controlling for twins and multiples. (∗∗∗) LR test
of H0: 1/A=0 is rejected at a significance level < 0.001.
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Table A.4: Baseline Results France
Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Age
23-27 0.38*** 0.22*** 1.69*** 1.52*** 1.56*** 1.51*** 0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
28-32 0.95*** 0.64*** 2.41*** 2.16*** 2.20*** 2.12*** 1.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
33-37 1.36*** 0.85*** 2.70*** 2.29*** 2.35*** 2.25*** 1.32***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
38-45 1.58*** 0.78*** 2.80*** 2.19*** 2.27*** 2.15*** 1.23***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Education
VT -0.00 -0.08*** 0.04 0.06 -0.08***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
TE -0.07*** -2.11*** -2.09*** -2.01*** -0.19***
(0.00) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01)
Education × Age
VT × 23-27 -0.02** -0.09*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.07* -0.07*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 23-27 -0.19*** -0.22*** 1.10*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 28-32 -0.02* -0.16*** 0.05** -0.23*** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 28-32 -0.21*** -0.24*** 1.79*** 1.68*** 1.69*** 1.70***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 33-37 -0.02 -0.20*** 0.06** -0.27*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 33-37 -0.12*** -0.11*** 1.99*** 1.88*** 1.89*** 1.90***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 38-45 -0.08*** -0.21*** 0.04 -0.27*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 38-45 -0.13*** -0.01 2.01*** 1.95*** 1.95*** 1.96***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Employment
Part-time 0.20*** 0.06*** 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Full-time -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Employment
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Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Not empl. 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage
25-49% 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50-74% -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75-89% -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90-94% -0.21*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
95-98% -0.23*** -0.07*** -0.18*** -0.01** -0.04*** -0.01** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
99-100% -0.21*** -0.03*** -0.15*** 0.02*** -0.01 0.03*** -0.00***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wage Increase
>0 -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
> median 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in months
6-11 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
12-23 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
24-35 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
≥36 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupational Choice
Teacher -0.12*** -0.00 -0.11*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort
1959-68 -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.28*** -0.10*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1969-78 -0.40*** -0.30*** -0.74*** -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
1979-89 -0.47*** -0.57*** -1.28*** -0.19*** -0.20***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
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Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Year
1997-1999 -0.01*** 0.10*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2000-2002 0.02*** 0.23*** -0.00 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2003-2005 0.07*** 0.37*** 0.05*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.30***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2006-2007 0.09*** 0.49*** 0.07*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.43***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Averages of time-varying covariates
Agei 0.34***
(0.01)
Wagei -0.11***
(0.00)
Empli -0.42***
(0.01)
∆Wagei -0.51***
(0.02)
Tenurei 0.13***
(0.01)
PastEmpli -0.22***
(0.03)
1/A 1.30(∗∗∗) 1.25(∗∗∗)
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.38*** 0.37*** -2.19*** -1.63*** -2.03***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 1,155,439 1,155,439 1,155,439 813,637 1,155,439 1,155,439
RSS in 1,000 985 142
LL in 1,000 -1,289 -717 -1,032 -1,031
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors based on 100 bootstrap replications (this
value was chosen due to very long computing times). Controlling for twins and multiples. (∗∗∗) LR test
of H0: 1/A=0 is rejected at a significance level < 0.001.
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A.II: Data Preparation and Estimation Samples
In order to improve the comparability of both data sets and to reduce issues of non-random
selection, the same sample-selection criteria are applied to both data sources. While we
have complete information about the dates of giving birth in both data sets, information
about the labour market state and the related administrative variables are missing for some
time periods. The first step is to create a balanced yearly panel structure. However, the
data only covers the period up to 2007 such that some women remain right-censored. In the
resulting panel, each female has complete records from 18 years old to max(45, agei,2007).
We create variables that capture the time periods without administrative records and define
missing periods as non-employment. Time-constant variables and variables that depend on
calendar time only are completed from records of other periods. Given that birthdays of
children are always observed, the number of children in year t can be created for all periods.
Unlike all other variables, yit refers to the upcoming year, e.g. the number of children which
will be born between t and t+ 1. This is reasonable because we study the impact of current
or past factors on current or future fertility.
If there are parallel records for the same individual, the employment record with em-
ployment subject to social-security is always kept. If two parallel periods of dependent
employment are recorded, the record with the higher labour income is kept and the wage of
the lower paid income is added to it. Periods of employment subject to social-security are
always kept in favour of any other parallel record. Note that for now, periods are recorded on
a daily and not on a yearly basis. In order to obtain a panel on a yearly basis, we condition
on the 31st of May: we only use the information available on this specific day. The choice of
this date is arbitrary but avoids the summer months, the time around the turn of the year
and other typical dates for changing the state of employment. Robustness checks are per-
formed using different cut-off dates to acknowledge the possibility of non-random selection.
The resulting panel contains 242,987 women in Germany and 156,512 in France (Panel 1
in Table A.5). Finally, individuals with missing information on education are dropped and
the German data is restricted to women with at least one period of dependent employment,
since only those individuals are contained in the French data. The resulting sample for the
estimations therefore contains 173,843 females for Germany and 102,574 females for France
(Panel 2). To further harmonise the data structure, some employment information for Ger-
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many is recoded. All periods during which the individual is not dependently employed in
Germany are classified as non-observed as it is the case in the French data.
Table A.5: Data dimensions after different data preparation steps
Panel 1 Panel 2
Germany N 242,987 173,843∑N
i=1 Ti 2,572,810 1,895,629
France N 156,512 102,574∑N
i=1 Ti 1,575,165 1,155,439
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are given in Table A.2. We use the
highest life-time educational achievement for each female for our analysis. For years pre-
ceding its attainment, this variable can be interpreted as expected educational degree. Fol-
lowing Arntz et al. (2017) and Lauer and Weber (2003), we group education information
into three categories: having no educational achievement (no VT), having completed a
vocational training (VT) and holding a tertiary education diploma (TE). The education
information is corrected using the imputation procedure number 1 of Fitzenberger et al.
(2006) but allowing only for three instead of six possible outcomes. Due to the different
education systems in both countries, in particular with respect to professional education,
the estimated education parameters need to be interpreted cautiously. To control at least
partly for job choice, an indicator is created for professions with a high child-amenity value.
As a simplified proxy, we use primary and nursery school teachers. These professions are
unambiguously identifiable in both data sets and empirical evidence by Hoem et al. (2006)
indicates that teachers indeed have low levels of childlessness and high ultimate fertility
rates. Tenure is defined as continuous employment at the same company, regardless of
changes in working hours, work contract, salary or position. Interruptions in the form of
non-employment or employment at another firm for up to 180 days are allowed. A woman
is said to have experienced non-employment during the past 365 days if she has remained
unobserved for more than 28 days. For the supplementary country-specific regression for
Germany, periods of non-employment are broken up into periods of registered unemploy-
ment, of official inactivity and non-observation. Registered inactivity refers to periods of
sickness, incapacity to work, maternity, child-rearing, household, non-profit care giving and
voluntary pension insurance. Persons insure themselves voluntarily for two main reasons:
either because they are self-employed and judge the insurance to be beneficial or because
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they seek an entitlement to a statutory old-age pension by contributing during periods of
inactivity. To be categorized as inactive, the second option is used by additionally requiring
the salary to be zero during the period of voluntary insurance.
A.III Poisson Panel Models
In this Appendix we describe different panel estimators for Poisson regression. The starting
point are equations (1) and (2) as given in Section 5. A first approach is to use a pooled
maximum likelihood estimator that applies the usual cross sectional model to all person and
year observations (pooled sample). Pooled estimation is consistent if
E[yit|xit] = a λit = a exp(xitβ) , (5)
with a = E[ai] and ai statistically independent of xit, t = 1, ..., Ti. The Poisson distribution
and condition (5) imply equidispersion: V ar[yit|xit, ai] = E[yit|xit, ai], which tends not to
fit the data. Overdispersion in the data will not harm consistency of the estimates but
ML estimation will produce incorrect standard errors. Robust standard errors should be
adopted to account for the possibility of overdispersion. A line of research especially focuses
on models that account for over- and underdispersion (Wang and Famoye, 1997; Melkersson
and Rooth, 2000). Another problem is a misspecification of the conditional distribution
due to serial dependence, e.g. the possibility of yit and yir, t 6= r not being independent
conditional on xi and ai. We address this issue by using clustered standard errors, where
clustering takes place on the individual level.
The availability of panel data permits the modelling of unobserved individual features
in addition to the usual error term. We consider random and fixed effects models which are
assumed to satisfy
E[yit|xi1, ...,xiTi , ai] = E[yit|xit, ai], t = 1, ..., Ti (6)
Pr(yi1, ...yiTi |xi, ai) =
Ti∏
t=1
Pr(yit|xi, ai). (7)
with xi = (xi1, ..., xiTi). Equation (6) defines strict exogeneity of xit conditional on ai,
while Equation (7) defines independence of the dependent variable over time conditional on
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xi and ai. The strict exogeneity assumption rules out lagged values of yit as explanatory
variables, which is plausible according to our theoretical model. Moreover, it does not permit
for feedback effects from the idiosyncratic error term on future regressors. The conditional
joint density for individual i is obtained by integrating out the unobserved individual-specific
effect:
Pr(yi1, ..., yiTi |xi) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(yi1, ..., yiT |xi, ai)f(ai|xi)dai (8)
Assuming ai to be iid distributed and hence uncorrelated with the regressors defines the
random effects model, which strongly simplifies the estimation via ML but whose estimation
results are sensitive to violations of this assumption. In the Poisson model with Gamma-
distributed random effects, ai is assumed to be iid and to follow a Gamma(A,A) distribution
with E[ai] = 1 and V ar[ai] = 1/A. The parameter A is estimated along with the β. As
derived in Cameron and Trivedi (2013, p.361), the joint density (8) becomes:
Pr(yi1, ..., yiT |xi) =
Ti∏
t=1
λyitit
yit!
×
(
A∑Ti
t=1 λit + A
)A
×
(
Ti∑
t=1
λit + A
)−∑Tit=1 yit
Γ(
∑Ti
t=1 yit + A)
Γ(A)
.
(9)
This extension now allows for overdispersion, since E[yit|xit] = λit and V ar[yit|xit] = λit +
λ2it/A.
If E[ai|xi1, ..., xiT ] 6= E[ai] or if condition (5) is not met, pooled ML estimation and the
random effects model will be inconsistent. In this case, the fixed effects approach may be
more appropriate as it allows for arbitrary dependence between xi and ai.
For the Poisson model with multiplicative fixed effects, there are three different ap-
proaches for estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013, chapter 9.4): (i) moment-based esti-
mation eliminating the fixed effect by mean differencing similar to the linear model. (ii)
Joint estimation of β and ai via ML. Here no incidental parameter bias occurs since ai
drops out of the concentrated likelihood function and (iii) conditional ML estimation of β
conditional on a sufficient statistic for the individual effects. We use the third approach
by applying the method of Andersen (1970). Palmgren (1981) and Hausman, Hall and
Griliches (HHG, 1984) have shown that the log-likelihood of the fixed effects Poisson model
conditional on the individual sum of counts ki =
∑Ti
t=1 yit does not depend on ai. Given (1)
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and (2), the conditional joint density for individual i becomes
Pr
(
yi1, ..., yiTi |xi,
Ti∑
t=1
yit
)
=
(
∑Ti
t yit)!∏Ti
t yit!
×
Ti∏
t=1
(
aiλit∑
s aiλis
)yit
, (10)
which results in the conditional population log-likelihood function
Lc(β) =
N∑
i=1
[
ln
(
Ti∑
t=1
yit
)
!−
Ti∑
t=1
ln(yit!) +
Ti∑
t=1
yitln
(
λit∑Ti
s=1 λis
)]
. (11)
The conditional ML estimator βˆFE maximises this function.
The fixed effects Poisson estimator is consistent for β as long as assumption (1) is satisfied
(Wooldridge, 1999). This leaves both the marginal distribution of ai and the conditional
distribution of yi given xi completely unrestricted and hereby allows for any mean-variance
relationship of yit and for dependence between yit and yir, t 6= r. Both the fixed and the
random effects model require cluster-robust standard errors to account for within cluster
correlation, which are implemented using cluster bootstraps (for more details see Cameron
and Trivedi, 2010).
The fixed effects Poisson estimation has two main drawbacks: on the one hand, coeffi-
cients of time-invariant variables are not identified.2 On the other hand, marginal effects
wrt xit cannot be computed because they depend on the ai which are also left unidentified.
In the random effects model, average marginal effects are well defined since the individual
effect is multiplicative, uncorrelated with the exogenous variables and satisfies E[ai] = 1.
However, the random effects approach produces inconsistent results if the individual effect is
correlated with the explanatory variables. As intermediate between both models, ai can be
seen as conditionally correlated with xit. This idea was originally formulated by Mundlak
(1978) and Chamberlain (1980, 1982) for the linear case. In the correlated random effects
(CRE) model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013, chapter 9.5.4), the individual effect is specified
as
ai = exp(x¯iξ + i), (12)
2Actually, the HHG framework yields estimates for the parameters of the time-invariant covariates, a
feature that is not common for fixed effects models. For further explanations see Allison and Waterman
(2002).
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where x¯i denotes the vector of time averages of the time-varying covariates and i is an iid
error term. The first summand in the exponential captures the correlation between ai and
the regressors, while i is required to be independent of the regressors. In this specification,
the effect of time-constant variables cannot be distinguished from ai unless time-constant
variables are uncorrelated with the individual effect. If this is the case, time-constant
variables are not included in x¯i and their partial effect can be estimated. Plugging (12) into
(1) yields
E[yit|xit, ai] = exp(xitβ + x¯iξ + i) . (13)
If ξ 6= 0, there is correlation between ai and xit and the application of a CRE model instead
of a simple RE model is appropriate. Assuming exp(i) iid∼ Gamma(A,A), the expected count
simplifies to
E[yit|xit, ai] = exp(xitβ + x¯iξ) (14)
with xit including an intercept. This is a Poisson-Gamma RE model with x¯i as additional
regressors. The equivalent of the marginal effects in (4) are
MEj =
∂E[yit|xit, ai]
∂xitj
= βj E[yit|xit, ai] + 1
Ti
ξj E[yit|xit, ai]. (15)
In our empirical analysis we compute average marginal effects, which are sample averages
of differences in estimated conditional expectations when one of the regressors increases by
one unit. This is more adequate for discrete regressors and more convenient in the presence
of interaction terms. For more details, and related references for the Poisson count models
for panel data, see the textbooks by Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and Wooldridge (2010).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the appropriateness of applying the above
model to the fertility context. As outlined in Section 4, the data is count data and includes
personal information on the individual, her current job, her employment history and control
variables but does not exhaustively include all variables that play a role in fertility. For ex-
ample, our economic framework presented in the supplementary material S.I comprises the
unobserved personal preference for children, and family policy variables. These are likely
to simultaneously affect fertility behaviour and female employment characteristics but are
45
unavailable in the data. Therefore, disregarding them may induce an estimation bias. In
order to mitigate this issue we exploit the panel structure of the data by allowing indi-
vidual effects ai that capture any time-constant information of the omitted variables. The
individual-specific effect can also include time-constant attributes of the partner. His income
is also likely to be correlated with female education and income. The inclusion of correlated
ai terms also addresses simultaneity issues that are due to interrelated employment and fer-
tility decisions. Suppose the fertility equation can be reduced to yit = xitβ1 +z1,itβ2 +u1,it,
with xit denoting a vector of employment characteristics, z1,it a vector of control variables
and u1,it the error term comprising the individual-specific effect ai and an idiosyncratic er-
ror term 1,it. Employment characteristics depend on past fertility outcomes. For instance
for the j’th variable xjit = yi,t−1α1 + z2,itα2 + u2,it, with z2,it a vector of relevant control
variables and u2,it an error term including the same individual-specific effect ai and an id-
iosyncratic error term 2,it. This relationship introduces some correlation between u1,it and
xjit, so that in order to consistently estimate the parameters of the fertility equation for
yit, we need to control for the relationship between xit and u1,it. By applying a CRE or
FE model, we can condition on ai and allow hereby for possible unconditional correlations
between fertility and employment decisions (simultaneity). Only the remaining variation
due to the idiosyncratic error terms 1,it and 2,it are required to be uncorrelated, otherwise
the CRE and FE models are inconsistently estimated.
The validity of the RE, FE and CRE models is sensitive to violations of the strict exo-
geneity assumption. First, in order to satisfy this assumption, the past number of children
cannot be included in the regression. If past fertility outcomes affect both current employ-
ment characteristics and the current number of children, the omission of yi,t−1 will induce a
bias. As discussed above, past fertility is acknowledged to have an impact on employment
characteristics, resulting in a correlation between u1,it and at least one regressor. However,
we claim the dependent variable to be entirely determined by xit, zit, ai and 1,it and there-
fore conditionally uncorrelated with its lagged value. If this assumption holds, an omission
of the lagged dependent variable is justified and does not induce a bias. Second, the strict
exogeneity assumption implies the absence of a so-called feedback effect of the error term
on future dependent variables. The inclusion of the individual-specific effects, which are
allowed to be correlated with explanatory variables, are helpful to absorb most of this cor-
relation. Time-variant shocks directly affecting the current dependent variable and future
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explanatory variables (and not via the dependent variable) should be rare, although this
cannot be tested for. Since allowing for a correlation between ai and xit is indispensable,
we focus on the FE and CRE model.
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S.I: A Model for the Optimal Number of Children
The utility Ui of female i is characterised by her preferences over consumption, hours of
work, schooling and the number of children which are denoted by (c, h, s, y), respectively.
Following Becker and Lewis (1973), the optimal number of children maximises the woman’s
utility function Ui(c, h, s, y) subject to the household’s budget constraint. To remain focused
on relevant channels, we assume a unitary approach of the household, and consider only the
utility function of the mother. In contrast to Becker and Lewis (1973), the utility derived
from children depends only on their quantity and not on their quality, because expendi-
ture per child (”quality”) is assumed to be exogenously determined by social expectations
(Duesenberry, 1960; Willis, 1973).
We assume neither a specific functional form for Ui, nor that Ui is monotonically in-
creasing in y. This is helpful to explain why some women prefer to stay childless, or have a
small number of children. However, in order to reduce the dimension of heterogeneity, we
assume that for any i the individual-specific utility function is related to an average utility
function U(c, h, s, y) by
Ui(c, h, s, y) = U(c, h, s, y) + acic+ ahih+ asis+ ayiy + ai, (16)
where the heterogeneity components (aci, ahi, asi, ayi, ai) follow some joint distribution. These
parameters denote individual preferences for consumption, labour, schooling and children.
They are known by the woman but unobserved by the econometrician. Regarding a woman’s
choice of her optimal number of children, we only have to focus on ayi explicitly. We assume
that U is increasing in y and concave.
In order to be consistent with our empirical model, we consider the total number of
children instead of conception. However, given the conditionally exogenous level of yi,t−1, it
is equivalent for the woman to choose either the number of children yit or conception.
The budget constraint is given by
pcc+ pyy = [1− t1(y)]m1(h, s, y) +m2 + t2(y), (17)
with c, h, s, y ≥ 0, pc the price of consumption and py the cost induced by children. Ex-
penditures on consumption and on children appear on the LHS of (17). The income of the
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household on the RHS of (17) consists of non-negative labour market income of the mother
m1, and of the partner m2. The number of children can affect the household income in
three possible ways: first, children impose opportunity costs in terms of lost wages, skill
depreciation or career impediment. This channel is captured by the function m1(h, s, y).
The woman is aware that her labour income is nonincreasing in the number of children and
nondecreasing in hours and schooling. Since child-rearing is still mainly a female task, as the
take-up rates of the child-rearing benefits in both countries suggest, the opportunity costs
are assumed to be entirely borne by the woman while the partner’s income m2 is exogenous.
A mother can opt between withdrawing from the labour market to take care of her chil-
dren or continuing to work. Empirically, we consider the cases of non-participation, h = 0,
part-time and full-time work. Second, children affect the household income via the income
taxation scheme t1(y). This subsidised tax rate 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 1 is nonincreasing in y and cap-
tures the French family tax splitting, the German child tax allowance and earnings-related
child-rearing benefits. Third, the government may distribute a lump-sum cash benefit t2(y)
which is nondecreasing in y and independent of the income and employment decision of
the parents. This corresponds to child cash benefits in both countries and the French basic
allowance of the early childhood benefit. All three of these channels can be influenced by
the national family policies and may be different in France and Germany.
We assume that the choice of schooling is made earlier in life and is exogenous when
deciding about children. For simplification, we treat the discrete variable y as if it was
continuous. Then, maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint (17)
yields the necessary condition for a maximum:
∂U
∂y
(c, h, s, y) + ayi ≤ λ
(
py + t
′
1(y)m1(h, s, y)− [1− t1(y)]
∂m1
∂y
(h, s, y)− t′2(y)
)
(18)
with equality if y > 0. The term λ ≥ 0 corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier associated to
the budget constraint. While the LHS represents the marginal utility of an additional child,
the RHS corresponds to the marginal cost. Note that the woman’s decision depends upon
her marginal utility, and that most unobserved individual heterogeneity enters her decision
rule additively. Sufficient conditions ensuring the existence of a nonempty set of solutions
to this inequality are not very restrictive. The unobserved individual preference for children
ayi allows women with the same level for all explanatory variables to have different numbers
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of children. The first order condition (18) for the optimal number of children illustrates the
three channels for a family policy to reduce the marginal price of children. Ceteris paribus,
the number of children of woman i tends to be high when the marginal opportunity costs
∂m1/∂y are low, when both the tax reduction t1(y) and the marginal tax reduction t
′
1(y) ≤ 0
are high (due to ∂m1/∂y ≤ 0), and when the marginal lump sum benefit t′2(y) is high. In
the following, we will further highlight the impact of relevant variables in the first order
condition (18).
If French mothers adjust their working behaviour following childbirth less than German
mothers due to better coordinated childcare facilities, ∂m1/∂y is smaller in absolute value
in France than in Germany and total fertility is likely to be higher in France compared to
Germany. In addition, opportunity costs are likely to have an impact on the timing of births:
due to difficulties in reconciling family and working life, German women with family and
career aspirations can either have children early and start a career when their children are
old enough to attend kindergarten (three years), or postpone their first childbirth to a point
in time at which career goals have already been achieved. Francesconi (2002) proxies career
advancement by a wage increase and finds empirical evidence for the US that an upward
wage slope affects fertility negatively. Additionally, German women often exploit time out
of work for conceiving several children sequentially in order to reduce the opportunity costs
(Arntz et al., 2017).
The optimality condition (18) also highlights the ambiguous impact of a woman’s income
on her fertility decision: on the one hand, the decrease in the marginal cost of children
through lower income taxes (due to t′1(y) ≤ 0) is more pronounced the higher the income.
On the other hand the opportunity cost term ∂m1/∂y ≤ 0 may well compensate the first
effect. The total increase in the cost of a child with female wages therefore depends on the
functional form of t1(y) and may be less important in France than in Germany, due to a
more pronounced wage decrease in Germany and higher family tax benefits in France. A
reduction in the cost of children or even a positive income effect may especially be the case
for high income French households, which benefit from relatively generous aggregated child
benefits as described in Section 2. However, neither the wage of the partner, nor the non-
labour family income is recorded in our data base, ruling out the differentiation between
opportunity cost and income effect, as well as the differentiation between the different
taxation parameters.
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Regarding schooling, two opposite effects occur in equation (18): on the one hand, longer
schooling increases m1 and hence absolute opportunity costs of children. On the other hand,
while deciding over the length of schooling, children and schooling may act as substitutes:
women with a strong preference for children (positive ayi) may self-select themselves in
reducing the length of schooling (Adda et al., 2017). However, here we consider this choice
as predetermined.
One main source for the randomness of y is the individual-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity term ayi which justifies the inclusion of fixed or correlated random effects ai in our
empirical specification. We also see that macroeconomic variables which are similar for all
women in one country and vary over time do play an important role. We therefore introduce
time dummies to control for py, t1, t
′
1, t
′
2. We include a comprehensive set of explanatory vari-
ables xit which capture schooling, income and hours of work. Under some mild regularity
conditions, expression (18) can be used to express the number of children as a function of
m1, s, unobserved heterogeneity and other explanatory variables and yields our specification
for the conditional probability Pr[y = yit|xit, ai] to have yit children.
S.II Additional Empirical Results
Additional empirical results are presented. We extend the above specifications which con-
sidered only explanatory variables available both for France and Germany, by including
country-specific regressors (available only for France or only for Germany). For Germany,
additional observations are now included which had to be dropped because of the tight
selection criteria in the French data. This permits to assess the robustness of the results
in Section 6 and to obtain estimates for the marginal effects for additional variables. The
results are presented in Tables S.1 and S.2.
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Table S.1: Country-specific Results for Germany
Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Age
23-27 0.16*** 0.07*** 1.02*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.43***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
28-32 0.39*** 0.19*** 1.40*** 1.12*** 1.19*** 1.12*** 0.81***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
33-37 0.60*** 0.26*** 1.64*** 1.20*** 1.29*** 1.20*** 1.00***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
38-45 0.78*** 0.23*** 1.81*** 1.15*** 1.26*** 1.15*** 1.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education
VT -0.11*** -0.96*** -0.72*** -0.84*** -0.25***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
TE -0.10*** -2.83*** -2.54*** -2.36*** -0.47***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.01)
Education × Age
VT × 23-27 -0.06*** -0.02*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TE × 23-27 -0.14*** -0.12*** 1.03*** 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.86***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
VT × 28-32 -0.06*** 0.01 0.68*** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.57***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TE × 28-32 -0.22*** -0.16*** 2.00*** 1.53*** 1.65*** 1.59***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
VT × 33-37 0.02** 0.06*** 0.80*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TE × 33-37 -0.20*** -0.09*** 2.43*** 1.80*** 1.97*** 1.89***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
VT × 38-45 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.88*** 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.64***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TE × 38-45 -0.11*** -0.03** 2.64*** 1.86*** 2.05*** 1.97***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Employment
Part-time 0.31*** 0.04*** 0.70*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Full-time 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.39*** -0.03*** 0.01* -0.01 -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage
Continued on next page
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25-49% -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50-74% -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.27*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75-89% -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.42*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90-94% -0.30*** -0.17*** -0.55*** -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.22***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
95-98% -0.38*** -0.19*** -0.81*** -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
99-100% -0.44*** -0.22*** -1.13*** -0.07*** -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Wage Increase
>0 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.03*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
>median 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in months
6-11 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
12-23 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.15*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
24-35 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
≥36 0.01** 0.00*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupational Choice
Teacher 0.08*** 0.00 0.18*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort
1959-68 -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.46*** -0.55*** -0.54***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
1969-78 -0.21*** -0.31*** -1.04*** -0.31*** -0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
1979-89 -0.26*** -1.24*** -2.36*** -0.58*** -0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Year
1997 - 1999 -0.00 0.07*** -0.01* 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Continued on next page
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2000 - 2002 0.01*** 0.14*** 0.03*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2003 - 2005 0.01 0.19*** 0.05*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2006 - 2007 -0.01* 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.40***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regressors specific for Germany
Past Employment
Unemployed 0.04*** -0.01*** 0.11*** -0.00* 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inactive 0.94*** 0.23*** 0.74*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.52***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Unobserved -0.24*** -0.03*** -0.43*** -0.00 -0.05*** 0.00*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nationality
Foreigner -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.17*** -0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Former GDR
GDR 0.45*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.46***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Former GDR × Cohort
GDR × 1959-68 -0.02 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
GDR × 1969-78 -0.37*** 0.03*** 0.11*** -0.24***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
GDR × 1979-89 -0.51*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.07
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Federal States
SH & MV -0.24*** 0.01 -0.54*** -0.06*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.10***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
LS & B -0.25*** -0.00 -0.60*** -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.10***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NRW -0.29*** -0.01*** -0.68*** -0.08*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hesse -0.31*** -0.00 -0.73*** -0.08*** -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
RP & S -0.34*** 0.00 -0.73*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BW -0.26*** 0.00 -0.64*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.11***
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(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bavaria -0.26*** -0.01** -0.62*** -0.09*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
B & H -0.33*** -0.02*** -0.74*** -0.06*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
S & B -0.21*** 0.00 -0.46*** -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SA & T -0.21*** 0.00 -0.46*** -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Averages of time-varying covariates
Agei 0.54***
(0.01)
Wagei -0.12***
(0.01)
Empli -0.11***
(0.01)
∆Wagei -0.53***
(0.02)
Tenurei -0.02***
(0.01)
PastUnempli 0.12***
(0.02)
PastInacti 3.03***
(0.02)
PastUnobsi -0.34***
(0.02)
1/A 3.22(∗∗∗) 2.41(∗∗∗)
(0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.57*** 0.31*** -1.38*** -0.88*** -2.16***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Observations 2,212,027 2,2120,27 2,212,027 1,0101,77 2,212,027 2,212,027
RSS in 1,000 1205 132
LL in 1,000 -1,832 -877 -1,359 -1,343
Notes:* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors based on 100 bootstrap replications (this
value was chosen due to very long computing times). Controlling for twins and multiples. SH & MV =
Schleswig-Holstein & Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, LS & B = Lower Saxony & Bremen, NRW = North
Rhine-Westphalia, RP & S = Rhineland-Palatinate & Saarland, BW = Baden-Wuerttemberg, B & H =
Berlin & Hamburg, S & B = Saxony & Brandenburg, T & SA =Thuringia & Saxony-Anhalt. (∗∗∗) LR test
of H0: 1/A=0 is rejected at a significance level < 0.001.
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Table S.2: Country-specific Results for France
Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Age
23-27 0.31*** 0.20*** 1.63*** 1.49*** 1.52*** 1.47*** 0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
28-32 0.81*** 0.60*** 2.30*** 2.09*** 2.12*** 2.05*** 1.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
33-37 1.17*** 0.82*** 2.54*** 2.23*** 2.27*** 2.18*** 1.28***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
38-45 1.33*** 0.75*** 2.59*** 2.13*** 2.19*** 2.08*** 1.19***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Education
VT 0.01** -0.06** 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.08***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
TE -0.06*** -2.09*** -0.00 -2.05*** -1.98*** -0.19***
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01)
Education × Age
VT × 23-27 -0.01 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.14*** -0.07* -0.07*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 23-27 -0.19*** -0.21*** 1.11*** 1.03*** 1.05*** 1.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 28-32 -0.02* -0.16*** 0.05* -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 28-32 -0.23*** -0.25*** 1.77*** 1.62*** 1.65*** 1.66***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 33-38 -0.03** -0.21*** 0.05** -0.28*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 33-38 -0.12*** -0.14*** 1.99*** 1.81*** 1.85*** 1.86***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
VT × 38-45 -0.09*** -0.21*** 0.03 -0.28*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TE × 38-45 -0.09*** -0.05*** 2.04*** 1.87*** 1.92*** 1.92***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Employment
Part-time 0.17*** 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Full-time -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Employment
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Not empl. 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage
25-49% -0.01* -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
50-74% -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
75-89% -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
90-94% -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
95-98% -0.21*** -0.08*** -0.16*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
99-100% -0.18*** -0.04*** -0.12*** 0.01 -0.02* 0.02** -0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wage Increase
>0 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
median 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in months
6-11 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
12-23 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
24-35 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
≥ 36 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupational Choice
Teacher -0.09*** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.03*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohort
1959-68 -0.08*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.13*** 0.02*** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1969-78 -0.27*** -0.22*** 0.00 -0.53*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
1979-89 -0.34*** -0.48*** -0.00** -1.01*** -0.07** -0.07*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Continued on next page
57
Linear Poisson
OLS FE Pooled FE RE CRE CRE-ME
Year
1997-1999 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2000-2002 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.04*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2003-2005 0.12*** 0.35*** 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.29***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2006-2007 0.14*** 0.45*** 0.13*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.40***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regressors specific for France
Married 0.58*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.52***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Iˆle-de-France -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Overseas -0.35*** -0.43*** 0.00 -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.36***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Averages of time-varying covariates
Agei 0.29***
(0.01)
Wagei -0.09***
(0.00)
Empli -0.45***
(0.02)
∆Wagei -0.53***
(0.02)
Tenurei 0.13***
(0.01)
PastEmpli -0.17***
(0.03)
Marriedi 0.06***
(0.01)
1/A 1.20(∗∗∗) 1.16(∗∗∗)
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.23*** 0.29*** -2.31*** -1.92*** -2.14***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 1,135,772 1,135,772 1,135,772 796,164 1,135,772 1,135,772
RSS in 1,000 880 134
LL in 1,000 -1,228 -694 -1,005 -1,004
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Notes:* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors based on 100 bootstrap replications (this
value was chosen due to very long computing times). Controlling for twins and multiples. (∗∗∗) LR test
of H0: 1/A=0 is rejected at a significance level < 0.001.
Coefficients specific to Germany reveal important differences between females who lived
in the former GDR and females raised in former West Germany, with these differences
varying over cohorts. The estimates of federal state dummies are significant but do not
differ largely in their size. The coefficients of interest discussed in Section 6 are found to
be robust to the inclusion of further country-specific variables. The wage effect and the
education effect even increase in size, such that the difference in opportunity costs between
France and Germany become even more pronounced.
The French baseline parameter estimates of interest are completely robust to additional
control variables. This merits attention because for France a binary variable indicating the
marital status is included. As expected, being married increases the number of children
considerably by 0.52 children. Even though this variable does not capture employment or
income of the partner, nor if the partner is living in the same household, the unchanged
coefficients suggest that the omission of marriage in the baseline regression does not induce
a bias. Living in proximity to Paris reduces the number of children compared to all other
departments significantly by 0.05 children. Interestingly, there is a large negative impact of
being born overseas (-0.36 children), suggesting that French mainland attitudes and French
mainland socio-cultural conventions do affect fertility.
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